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October 2020 
Updates from the PA Legislature 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
House Bill 2175—Human Trafficking Package (Schroeder)   
 Final Passage, Oct. 21, 2020 [Senate] 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=2175  
“This bill will amend Section 5920 of Title 42 to expand the list of offenses 
where an expert may testify about the dynamics of sexual violence and 
victim responses to sexual violence.  
  
This legislation is necessary as a result of amendments to existing sexual 
offenses and the creation of additional sexual offenses (human trafficking) in 
the Crimes Code.  Significantly, this legislation will strengthen the ability of 
prosecutors to combat sexual violence and human trafficking throughout Pennsylvania by permitting experts to testify 
about the dynamics of victim behavior.  Such testimony is critical in sexual violence cases as it assists the trier of fact in 
understanding the complexities of such behavior, including the reasons victims often refrain from reporting their 
experiences to law enforcement.” 
House Bill 1538—Amending the Parole Code (White)             Final Passage, Oct.21, 2020 [Senate] 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1538  
This legislation requires “those convicted of rape, human trafficking, sexual assault, involuntary deviate sexual 
intercourse, incest, among other sex offenses, to wait three years before re-applying for parole. In addition, the bill 
provides that offenders required to register under the Sexual Offender Registration Act similarly wait three years to re-
apply for parole.” 
Senate Bill 976—Veterans Courts (Regan)                               Presented to the Governor Oct. 26, 2020 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=976  
This legislation “will codify Veterans Courts into law, allow Veterans Courts to permit participation by Veterans from 
adjacent counties, and allow county common pleas courts that have other problem-solving courts to establish 
“Veterans Tracks” – programs that utilize some components of a Veterans Court.” 
House Bill 440—Expungement Upon Pardon or Full Acquittal (Delozier)                                                      
 Approved by the Governor Oct. 29, 2020  
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=440  
Keep up to date with 
developments in criminal law, 
criminal procedure, and victims 
issues via this monthly 
newsletter.  
Comments or questions? 
Contact Haley Shultz at 
shulha02@gettysburg.edu. 
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“An Act amending Titles 18 (Crimes and Offenses) and 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of the Pennsylvania 
Consolidated Statutes, in criminal history record information, further providing for expungement, for petition for 
limited access, for clean slate limited access and for effects of expunged records and records subject to limited access; 
and, in administration of justice, further providing for attachment and summary punishment for contempts.” 
This legislation provides “an opportunity to expunge an individual’s record if they have been unconditionally pardoned 
or fully acquitted of all charges, based on the same conduct or arising from the same alleged criminal episode. The 
Commonwealth would receive notice of a potential expungement and would have an opportunity to object and 
conduct a hearing.” 
Senate Bill 1075—Enhancing the Penalties for Child Pornography (Arnold)          Final Passage, Oct. 6, 2020 [Senate] 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=1075  
“An Act amending Titles 18 (Crimes and Offenses), 23 (Domestic Relations) and 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure) of 
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, in minors, further providing for the offense of sexual abuse of children; in child 
protective services, providing for task force on child pornography; and, in sentencing, further providing for sentencing 
for offenses involving sexual abuse of children. “ 
Victims Issues 
Senate Bill 530—Protecting Student Sexual Assault Victims (Martin)                 
 Presented to the Governor, Oct. 26, 2020 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=S&type=B&bn=530  
“An Act amending the act of March 10, 1949 (P.L.30, No.14), known as the Public School Code of 1949, in pupils and 
attendance, providing for students convicted or adjudicated delinquent of sexual assault; in safe schools, further 
providing for safe schools advocate in school districts of the first class; and, in educational tax credits, further providing 
for school participation in program.” 
This legislation requires “a student who is convicted or adjudicated delinquent of sexual assault to be expelled at the 
victim’s request, if they are enrolled in the same K-12 school district.” 
House Bill 1984—Protecting Victims of Rape and their Children (Benninghoff)     
Approved by the Governor, Oct. 29, 2020 
https://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2019&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1984  
“An Act amending Title 23 (Domestic Relations) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, in proceedings prior to 
petition to adopt, further providing for petition for involuntary termination and providing for special provisions when 
child conceived as a result of rape or incest. “ 
This legislation removes the “requirement that a victim of rape present a “replacement” adoptive parent for their child.” 
 
Updates from the Courts 
PA Supreme Court 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ROD L. JONES, JR.          DECIDED: October 30, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-17-2020mo%20-%20104591185118425750.pdf?cb=1  
“In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether opinion testimony from a detective concerning the behavior of child 
victims in response to sexual abuse, informed by that detective’s training and experience, constitutes lay or expert 
testimony under our rules of evidence. As a necessary corollary, we also address the continued validity of our decision in 
Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992), in light of the legislature’s enactment of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5920 
(permitting expert testimony concerning victim behavior in response to sexual abuse in certain criminal proceedings 
involving sexual offenses). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Superior Court’s order and remand for a new 
trial.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID CHMIEL           DECIDED: October 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-63-2020mo%20-%20104580075116495049.pdf?cb=1  
“In this serial, capital post-conviction appeal, Appellant challenges the validity of expert testimony based upon 
microscopic comparison of hair samples.” 
“Ultimately, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the 
verdict against him would be different in a trial in which Mr. Surma’s testimony would be excluded. The order of the 
post-conviction court is affirmed” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RUSSELL COX           DECIDED: October 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-41-2020mo%20-%20104580139116503334.pdf?cb=1  
“On March 26, 2019, we remanded this capital appeal to the PCRA court for further consideration of Russell Cox’s claim 
that, due to his intellectual disability,2 the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Supreme 
Court of the United States’ decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), precluded him from being sentenced to 
death. Upon remand, the PCRA court reconsidered the record and again determined that Cox had failed to establish 
that he was entitled to relief. We vacate that ruling, and we remand the case to the PCRA court for further 
proceedings.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DENNIS ANDREW KATONA         DECIDED: October 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-83-2019mo%20-%20104580109116496628.pdf?cb=1  
“We granted discretionary review in this case to consider the Superior Court’s application of the Independent Source 
Doctrine as a basis for upholding the trial court’s order denying the suppression motion filed by appellant Dennis 
Andrew Katona. We also granted review to consider, as a secondary matter, the validity of an intercept order issued 
under Section 5704(2)(iv) of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (“Wiretap Act”),2 which permits 
the recording of in-home conversations when only one party consents, so long as the intercept is approved by an 
authorized prosecutor and the president judge of a court of common pleas finds that probable cause supports the 
order. Upon review, we conclude the Superior Court properly invoked the Independent Source 1 This matter was 
reassigned to this author. 2 18 Pa.C.S. §§5701-5782. [J-83-2019] - 2 Doctrine, and therefore do not reach the various 
statutory and constitutional challenges appellant raises relative to the Wiretap Act.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LAVELLE JOHNSON                        DECIDED: October 21, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-20-2020oajc%20-%20104580097116496240.pdf?cb=1  
“We recently explained that, where law enforcement seeks to search a cell phone seized incident to arrest, the 
applicable rule is “exceedingly simple: . . . get a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Fulton, 179 A.3d 475, 489 (Pa. 2018); accord 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014). We granted discretionary review in this case of first impression to consider 
an issue that is not so simple: the permissible scope of such a warrant, under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania 
Constitution, to search an individual’s cell phone for evidence relating to illegal narcotics activity and firearms 
possession. But, as it turns out, our task in this case is less complicated than the question suggests, because we 
conclude the search warrant was so lacking in probable cause that it failed to justify any search of appellant’s cell 
phone. We thus reverse and remand.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. HENRY DANIELS           DECIDED: October 15, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/739CAPpco.pdf?cb=1  
“AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2020, the appeal is QUASHED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 (Pa. 
2020) (quashing serial appeal after concluding Williams v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016), does not 
provide exception to timeliness requirements of Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546, and thus 
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate appellate rights nunc pro tunc).” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ANTHONY REID          DECIDED: October 15, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-16-2019pco%20-%20104576394116190743.pdf?cb=1  
“AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2020, the appeal is QUASHED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 (Pa. 
2020) (quashing serial appeal after concluding Williams v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016), does not 
provide exception to timeliness requirements of Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546, and thus 
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate appellate rights nunc pro tunc). Appellant’s “Application for Leave to File 
Post-Submission Communication” filed February 15, 2019 is DENIED as moot. Appellant’s “Application for Leave to File 
Post-Submission Communication” filed May 12, 2020 is GRANTED” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CRAIG MURPHY             DECIDED: October 15, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/741CAPpco%20-%20104576444116191132.pdf?cb=1  
“AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 2020, the appeal is QUASHED. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 (Pa. 
2020) (quashing serial appeal after concluding Williams v. Pennsylvania, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1899 (2016), does not 
provide exception to timeliness requirements of Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546, and thus 
PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate appellate rights nunc pro tunc). Appellant’s “Application for Leave to File 
Post-Submission Communication” is GRANTED. Appellant’s “Application for Leave to File Supplemental Briefing 
Addressing the Jurisdiction of the Court in Light of [Reid]” is DENIED.” 
AQUIL JOHNSON v. JOHN WETZEL, SECRETARY PA, D.O.C., MARK GARMAN, SUPER., S.C.I. ROCKVIEW ET. 
AL., OFFICERS, AGENTS, SERVANTS, EMPLOYEES AND ATTORNEYS,          DECIDED: October 1, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-99-2020mo%20-%20104562057114991316.pdf?cb=1  
“This is a direct appeal from a Commonwealth Court order dismissing Appellant’s amended petition for review. In the 
petition, Appellant claimed he was entitled to a refund of monies deducted from his inmate account pursuant to Act 84 
because no procedural safeguards were in place when the deductions began. Recent decisions by this Court and the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals confirm that, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, certain 
safeguards must be applied before the first Act 84 deduction is made in connection with a given criminal sentence. See 
Bundy v. Wetzel, 646 Pa. 248, 261, 184 A.3d 551, 558-59 (2018); Montanez v. Secretary Pa. DOC, 773 F.3d 472, 486 (3d 
Cir. 2014). The issue here is whether relief is available where the first deduction was made before those decisions were 
announced.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ELWOOD SMALL                         DECIDED: October 1, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-116-2019mo%20-%20104562041114989408.pdf?cb=1  
“In this appeal, we consider the continued viability of what our jurisprudence has dubbed the “public record 
presumption,” which precludes a petitioner from establishing the existence of new facts that would support collateral 
review of an underlying conviction. See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017). Ordinarily, a petitioner 
seeking relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46, must file the petition within one 
year of the date upon which his or her judgment of sentence becomes final. The PCRA sets forth three exceptions to 
this one-year limitation. Among these is the “newly discovered fact” exception, which renders a petition timely when 
the petitioner establishes that “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could 
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). Interpreting this provision, this 
Court has held that the newly discovered fact exception is limited by a presumption relating to matters of public record, 
[J-116-2019] - 2 pursuant to which a court may find that information available to the public is not a fact that is 
“unknown” to the petitioner. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 523 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. 
Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 588 n.4 (Pa. 2000). In Burton, however, we reasoned that, due to unrepresented inmates’ 
diminished access to such records, the public record presumption “does not apply to pro se prisoner petitioners.” 
Burton, 158 A.3d at 620.  
In this case, the Superior Court reversed the PCRA court’s order granting relief to Appellant Elwood Small, reasoning, 
inter alia, that our holding in Burton did not apply to Small because he was represented by counsel some years earlier, 
in separate postconviction proceedings, and thus could not be considered pro se for purposes of Burton. Although we 
ultimately conclude that Small is not entitled to relief, we nonetheless are persuaded by Small’s frontal challenge to the 
public record presumption.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHRISTOPHER ROBERT WEIR          DECIDED: October 1, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-26-2020mo%20-%20104561716114967511.pdf?cb=1  
“We granted discretionary review to determine whether a challenge to the amount of restitution imposed pursuant to 
Section 1106 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing or 
the legality of the sentence, a dichotomy relevant to the need for issue preservation. Upon review, we conclude that a 
challenge to the sentencing court’s determination as to the amount of restitution sounds in sentencing discretion and, 
therefore, must be preserved. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court’s ruling that Weir’s restitution challenge 
implicates a discretionary aspect of the sentence that was not properly preserved and, therefore, was waived.” 
 
PA Superior Court 
(Reporting only cases with precedential value) 
Criminal Law & Procedure 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RODNEY DERRICKSON                                              FILED: October 30, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S39002-20o%20-%20104590740118397851.pdf?cb=1  
“Rodney Derrickson appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware 
County, following his resentencing subsequent to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), which required resentencing for juveniles 
originally sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP). After careful review, we affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. CHARLES WILLIAM LYNCH                            FILED: October 28, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A11020-20o.pdf?cb=2  
“A jury found Charles William Lynch, III, guilty of Possession with Intent to Deliver (“PWID”), Corrupt Organizations, 
Dealing in Proceeds of Unlawful Activities, Criminal Use of a Communication Facility, conspiracy to commit PWID, and 
conspiracy to commit Corrupt Organizations. He has appealed from the judgment of sentence and raises several 
sentencing issues, makes two arguments against the admission of a recorded phone call, and challenges the sufficiency 
and weight of the evidence. We affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. JEFFREY LYNN CLEMENS                            FILED: October 28, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S30018-20o%20-%20104588461118167138.pdf?cb=1  
“Jeffrey Lynn Clemens appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his jury trial conviction for Resisting 
Arrest and bench trial convictions for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”)-General Impairment, Careless 
Driving, and Restrictions on Alcoholic Beverages. Clemens challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. We 
affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BRANDON EUGENE DAVIS                              FILED: October 23, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A26032-20o%20-%20104584280117810071.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Brandon Eugene Davis, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Bucks County following his conviction by a jury on, inter alia, robbery, burglary, and conspiracy.1 After a careful review, 
we affirm.” 
“We find no abuse of discretion. The record reveals the trial court imposed four consecutive sentences for the robbery 
of Jonathan Nadav, C.N., Elle, and Manya. The trial court imposed either concurrent sentences or no further penalty for 
Appellant’s remaining convictions, including imposing a concurrent sentence for the robbery of Jonathan’s wife, Emily. 
In so doing, the trial court considered the mitigating factors,14 along with the need to protect the public, the gravity of 
Appellant’s offenses on the victims and community, and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). We 
agree with the trial court that Appellant was not entitled to a “volume discount” by having all of his sentences run 
concurrently. See Swope, supra. For all of the foregoing reason, we affirm.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MAXWELL LIAM DOLAN                                FILED: October 23, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A08034-17o%20-%20104584452117818445.pdf?cb=1  
“On April 1, 2016, the Commonwealth filed an interlocutory appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and asked it to 
exercise its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over any final order deeming a statute unconstitutional. According to the 
Commonwealth, the common pleas court necessarily declared Pa.R.Crim.P. 542(E)1 unconstitutional when it rejected 
the magisterial district judge’s ruling allowing the Commonwealth to rely exclusively on hearsay testimony to make a 
prima facie case at the first preliminary hearing and remanded for a new preliminary hearing, at which testimony from 
the alleged rape victim would be required. The Supreme Court, however, declined to take up the matter directly and, 
instead, transferred the appeal to this Court.  
On July 22, 2017, this panel filed an order and opinion reversing the trial court’s order and remanding the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with our decision. See Commonwealth v. Dolan, 167 A.3d 46 (Pa.Super. 2017). In so 
doing, we followed binding precedent set forth in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 165 A.3d 19 (Pa.Super. 2017), which 
held that both decisional law regarding a defendant’s due process rights at a preliminary hearing and Pennsylvania Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 542(E) permit the Commonwealth to rely exclusively on hearsay evidence to establish a prima 
facie case at a preliminary hearing.  
Appellee Dolan filed a timely petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which eventually 
granted his petition on August 20, 2020, in light of its treatment of the identical issue in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 
--- A.3d ----, 2020 WL 4092109 (Pa. July 21, 2020). Specifically, the Supreme Court in McClelland addressed: whether 
the Superior Court panel failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent set forth in Commonwealth ex rel. 
Buchanan v. Verbonitz, [525 Pa. 413] 581 A.[2d]3d 172, 174– 76 (Pa. 1990) in which five (5) Justices held that 
“fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.” Commonwealth v. 
McClelland, 179 A.3d 2, 3 (Pa. 2018). In reversing this Court, the Supreme Court held Rule 542(E)’s clause providing that 
“hearsay may establish the elements of any offense” at a preliminary hearing, could not be construed to mean that 
hearsay alone suffices to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing, contrary to Verbonitz. The Court further 
clarified that the Commonwealth's use of hearsay evidence alone to establish prima facie case at preliminary violated 
fundamental due process.  
Consistent with its decision in McClelland, the Supreme Court issued the following per curiam order in the case sub 
judice. AND NOW, this 20th day of August, 2020, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, and the order of 
the Superior Court is REVERSED. See Commonwealth v. McClelland, 2020 WL 4092109 (Pa. July 21, 2020). 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Order, 8/20/2020.  
In conformity with both our Supreme Court’s decision in McClelland and its subsequent order reversing our prior order 
in the case sub judice, we have no choice but to affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order entered below. Order 
affirmed.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TANISHA MUHAMMAD                                  FILED: October 23, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A16020-20o%20-%20104584404117816213.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Tanisha Muhammad, appeals from her judgment of sentence for interference with custody of children, 
false imprisonment, unlawful restraint, and conspiracy to commit these offenses. Based on Appellant’s convictions for 
interference with custody of children (“interference”) and conspiracy to interfere with custody of children 
(“conspiracy”), the trial court ordered Appellant to register as a sexual offender under Revised Subchapter H of the 
Sexual Offenders Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10—9799.42, 2 as a Tier I offender. 
We hold that SORNA is unconstitutional as applied to Appellant, because it creates an irrebuttable presumption that 
her convictions for interference and conspiracy make her a risk to commit additional sexual offenses. Accordingly, we 
vacate the trial court’s order directing her to register as a sexual offender. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of 
sentence.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID SANTANA                                 FILED: October 20, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-E02005-19o%20-%20104579532116438419.pdf?cb=1  
“In 2011, the General Assembly of Pennsylvania enacted the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(“SORNA”), which adopted Title I of the federal Adam Walsh Act. 1 A primary goal of the Adam Walsh Act (and, 
therefore, of SORNA) is addressing the inconsistencies that arose when 50 states had 50 unique, registration 
procedures for sex offenders. Congress therefore incentivized states to establish a national, coordinated registry. The 
federal government thereby hoped to track and to publicize sex offenders’ residences, employment locations, and 
online identities with improved accuracy and predictability.  
However, in 2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found SORNA’s registration requirements so injurious to 
reputation and individual liberty that they constitute a criminal punishment unto themselves. Commonwealth v. Muniz, 
164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Pennsylvania v. Muniz, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 925 (2018). Furthermore, 
Muniz barred retroactive application of SORNA’s registration, because the General Assembly violates the federal and 
Pennsylvania constitutions whenever it increases the punishment for a crime after that crime has occurred. Hence, the 
registration requirements of SORNA are unconstitutional if the Commonwealth applies them to someone whose 
underlying sexual offense occurred prior to SORNA’s effective date.  
In this appeal, we granted en banc review to determine whether, in light of the foregoing, the Commonwealth could 
constitutionally charge and convict Appellant David Santana with failing to register in Pennsylvania, under SORNA, for 
a pre-SORNA crime that occurred in New York. The trial court held SORNA’s registration requirements were not ex 
post facto punishments for Mr. Santana, because he moved to Pennsylvania after SORNA had taken effect.  By basing 
its decision on locality and not chronology, the trial court violated the precedents of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and the federal and state constitutions. We therefore reverse its order 
denying Mr. Santana’s post-sentence motions.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. ARDELL MATTHEW GROSS                   FILED: October 14, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A07031-20o%20-%20104574266116010229.pdf?cb=1  
“Ardell Matthew Gross appeals from the judgment of sentence entered for his convictions for first-degree murder and 
aggravated assault. He challenges the grant of the Commonwealth’s motion in limine and an evidentiary ruling. We 
affirm.” 
“Gross is not entitled to relief on this issue. If, as Gross contends, Detective Moore harbored some concern about 
Gross’s drinking, the detective’s testimony that he was not “overly concerned” was not misleading, as he also testified 
that Gross had been drinking to a point that he “wouldn’t ride in a car with him.” Moreover, the PBT results would not 
have allayed any misimpression about the degree of Detective Moore’s “concern.” Such evidence related strictly to the 
test results, not to Detective Moore’s “concern.” Furthermore, even assuming that Detective Moore’s testimony 
created a false impression that he was in fact not concerned about Gross’s alcohol use, and thus “opened the door,” any 
error in precluding the PBT results at that point was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. Koch, 
39 A.3d 996, 1003 (Pa.Super. 2011). The jury heard significant testimony that Gross was under the influence at the time 
of the crime, in addition to Detective Moore’s testimony on the subject. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
Judgment of sentence affirmed.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SAEED RASHEED JOHNSON                      FILED: October 09, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S19011-20o%20-%20104571333115766746.pdf?cb=1  
“Saeed Rasheed Johnson appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of ten to twenty years of imprisonment 
imposed after he was convicted of robbery and possessing an instrument of crime (“PIC”). Although we affirm 
Appellant’s convictions, we are constrained to vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.” 
“Since we find that Appellant’s 2010 New Jersey aggravated assault conviction was not a “crime of violence” as defined 
in Pennsylvania, he did not qualify for an enhanced sentence under § 9714. Accordingly, we must vacate Appellant’s 
sentence and remand for resentencing. However, we do not disturb Appellant’s underlying convictions. Convictions 
affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.” 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. RASHAWN DAVID WILLIAMS                  FILED: October 08, 2020 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S28017-20o%20-%20104569542115620762.pdf?cb=1  
“Appellant, Rashawn David Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on December 17, 2018, 1 
following his jury trial convictions for first-degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, tampering with physical 
evidence, and obstruction of administration of law. 2 Upon review, we affirm.” 
“We conclude that the trial court’s instruction was a clear and accurate representation of the law pertaining to self-
defense and the castle doctrine. Although Appellant urged the trial court to separate its instruction for the two 
defenses, it was unwarranted. As previously mentioned, Section 505 codified the law governing the use of defensive 
force into a single rule. Thus, it covers both self-defense generally and the castle doctrine specifically. Here, the trial 
court’s single jury instruction closely tracked the statutory language of Section 505. Upon review, we conclude that the 
instruction was an adequate representation of the law. “It is well settled that the jury is presumed to follow the trial 
court's instructions.” Commonwealth v. Cash, 137 A.3d 1262, 1280 (Pa. 2016). As such, we conclude that Appellant’s 
final appellate issue does not entitle him to relief. Judgment of sentence affirmed.” 
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